Category Archives: Uncategorized

Family transcript

This blog is mostly about work, but I can’t help but occasionally post about my family.  I am a single dad this weekend with my 1.5 years old (Stanley) and 3.5 year old (Walter) boys. Here is a transcript of our latest conversation.

Walter: Turtles come from eggs. And tadpoles are frogs.
Nate: Right. Where did you learn this? This is great.
Stan: Yeah.
Walter: And frogs jump really high.
Stan: Yeah.
Nate: You’re right!
Stan: Yeah.
Walter: Frogs can jump over rainbows.
Stan: Yeah.
Nate: I don’t think that is true.
Walter: When little boys jump over rainbows they hurt their heads. But frogs never hurt their heads.
Stan: Yeah.
Nate: I think frogs can hurt their heads. Stan, stop telling him yes.
Stan: Yeah.
Walter: No, frogs never hurt their heads. Little boys can hurt their heads. But only when they jump over rainbows.
Stan: Yeah.
Nate: I give up.
Stan: Pancake.

My blog is back

I am launching my blog on a new site after many months of inactivity. During this time I have switch jobs, cities, and disciplines.  From political science to management.  From Washington University to George Washington University.  From St. Louis to Silver Spring.  But my blog is back.

How can this product compete in a marketplace populated by so many competitor academic blogs?

Do I sound like a new business school professor?

Fortunately, this is a non-profit operation and my time isn’t worth very much. So I am mostly blogging for me to put ideas out there.

But I hope there is something in it for you as well. What I can offer is a bit of an insider-outsider perspective on both political science and business schools plus some insight into a couple of research areas.

I also plan to try out a couple of quirky ideas that are only mostly dumb. Not all dumb. I might even bring a few others along for the ride. More to come.

The first step was to migrated all of my old blog posts over to this new site.

I am happy to be back.

Nate

P.S. I keep thinking of a new blog name. I really think it could be “Trial, Typo, and Error.” That way I can incorporate my regular typos into the blog theme.

Blog by Nate Archives: International Tax and Legal Structures and Strategies I (Aug 11, 2013)

[I am migrating the old blog content into my new blog.  This includes my outsourced posts to Adam.]

International Tax Legal Structures and Strategies: Part I, Corporate Inversions

Guest Blog Post by Adam Rosenzweig

Blogging has been very light while I am teaching a one-week graduate class before I start parental leave in the Fall.  Here is a guest blog post from my friend Adam Rosenzweig.

________________________________

Nate has asked me to write a post on some common international tax structures used by multinational corporations to reduce their worldwide tax liability.  Originally, the idea was to list several of these into a single post.  Rather than do so, however, I thought it might be better to write a series of posts, each one describing a separate strategy.

With that in mind, I thought the best place to start would be where I left off in the prior post – so-called corporate inversions.  In particular, I thought this would be appropriate because of recent news that at least one bidder for Dellis considering a form of corporate inversion transaction as a way to use tax savings to finance the acquisition.

Turning to the basic corporate inversion transaction: assume a multinational corporation with the ultimate parent corporation, let’s call it US Parent, legally formed in Delaware.  Although the company initially focused primarily on the US market, eventually it expanded operations to other countries as well.  For simplicity (it doesn’t matter in the long run) assume that all foreign sales of the company are immediately taxed in the United States.  The foreign source income is eligible for foreign tax credits, but assume that due to the business model and tax structuring of the company the foreign tax credits are capped in some way such that there is a net foreign tax being paid in addition to US tax.  So long as the foreign operations comprise a small portion of the total income of the company this is just a cost of doing business.  But at some point the foreign operations grow to dominate the income of the US operations, say because foreign markets are high growth and US markets are mature.

At this point, the problem is that a primarily foreign company from a sales perspective is being treated as a primarily US company from a tax perspective solely because of its place of legal incorporation.  The solution, then, must be to convert the company from a US one to a foreign one for US tax purposes.  There is a huge hurdle to this solution, however.  Any change in form of a corporation, even a change in state of incorporation, is a realization event for US tax purposes.  This means that, absent a non-recognition provision, the owners of the company will have to pay tax on the re-incorporation.  Obviously, paying tax now to reduce tax later is not particularly appealing to US Parent.

So to accomplish the move offshore the corporation must find a tax free non-recognition provision, such as a merger.  This then raises a second problem – special rules (under Section 367 of the Internal Revenue Code) intended to prevent companies from moving assets offshore in a tax-free manner.  These rules “turn off” the non-recognition merger provisions if assets with untaxed US gain are moved offshore in an otherwise tax-free manner.  So the challenge is to find a tax-free reorganization provision that can be utilized without triggering these rules.

So here is one solution the market developed (of course, clever tax lawyers have devised others, but they get to a substantially similar result): (1) have US Parent form a “dummy” foreign corporation, let’s call it Foreign Parent, in the desired jurisdiction, say Bermuda, for one dollar; (2) have Foreign Parent form a Merger Sub in Delaware; (3) merge Merger Sub with and into US Parent with US Parent surviving in exchange for stock of Foreign Parent.  The result is a strange looking creature – the original shareholding public of US Parent owns 100% of the stock Foreign Parent, which owns 100% of the stock of US Parent, which in turn owns one share of Foreign Parent stock.  For specific reasons not particularly relevant to the inversion, it is helpful to leave this one share of stock technically outstanding.

The last step would be for US parent to distribute its foreign business up to Foreign Parent.  In this manner, future foreign earnings would be paid directly to Foreign Parent and not US Parent, thereby avoiding US tax.  This would be taxable to US Parent absent a non-recognition provision.  Sometimes this is ok because there is little gain in those assets and sometimes the distribution can be structured to be considered part of the tax-free reorganization.  If neither is applicable, Foreign Parent can just undertake its new foreign investment directly and over time shift foreign profits out of US Parent.

Why this convoluted structure?  The tax law disregards transitory steps in a transaction that have no independent economic substance.  So the merger of US Parent into Merger Sub with US Parent surviving is treated by the US tax law as an acquisition of the stock of US Parent by Foreign Parent for stock of Foreign Parent.  This is the crucial step.  Treating this as a stock acquisition means that only the shareholders of Foreign Parent have a realization event and thus need the benefit of a non-recognition provision.  Under the Code, a share-for-share exchange in which the former shareholders of the two companies own at least eighty percent of the stock of the resulting corporation is entitled to non-recognition (as either a so-called B Reorganization or collapsed into the formation of Foreign Parent and treated as a Section 351 tax free incorporation).  Thus, the public shareholders pay no tax (large public shareholders would have certain paperwork they need to file, but would mostly pay no tax).

Crucially, under this fictional stock sale, technically US Parent never goes out of existence or transfers any of its assets.  Thus, there is no realization event at the US Parent level at all (prior to any transfers of its foreign business to Foreign Parent).  Consequently, the special rule under Section 367 applicable to corporations moving US assets offshore does not apply as that only kicks in once there has been a realization event.

The final result: all US business of the multinational is owned by US Parent and taxed in the United States, but now all foreign business is owned directly or indirectly by Foreign Parent and no longer taxed by the United States.  This is effectively a self-help form of territorial taxation.

As before, any distributions paid by Foreign Corp to US shareholders will be taxable as dividends to US shareholders, but distributions to foreign shareholders are no longer subject to US withholding taxes.  So long as Foreign Corp is organized in a country with no withholding taxes no shareholders need pay withholding taxes on dividends ever again.  This was the result for a company called “Helen of Troy” that inverted in the 1990s.

The benefits continue.  Dividends from old US Parent to Foreign Parent may be subject to US tax, but this can be resolved either by locating Foreign Parent in a country with a tax treaty with the United States (which Helen of Troy did by organizing in Barbados which used to have a tax treaty with the United States) or by managing the cash flow through transfer pricing and other cash management techniques so that US Parent never pays a dividend.  The only ongoing cost of the structure is any foreign tax liability incurred by Foreign Corp, but so long as Foreign Corp is organized in a country with little to no corporate income tax this is not an issue either (there will typically be annual franchise taxes or fees but these are typically relatively small).  So long as the market does not capitalize a penalty into the price of the shares for owning stock in a foreign corporation rather than a Delaware corporation, which the evidence tends to shows it does not, there is no ongoing cost to shareholders either.

The inversion therefore provides a clean solution to a sticky problem – offshoring the foreign earnings of a US company without changing the actual business activity of the company or the business structure at all, in a tax-free manner.

In response to Helen of Troy, Treasury issued new rules under Section 367 requiring shareholders to recognize gain on a transfer of US stock to a foreign company if the old shareholders end up controlling the new foreign company and the resulting company does not have substantial foreign business.  These regulations were supposed to kill inversions by leveraging shareholder interest against corporate interest.  Unfortunately, all it seemed to do was force companies (such as Tyco) to wait until a drop in the market, when most public shareholders carried stock at a loss, to enter into inversion transactions.

It is for this reason that inversions, notwithstanding the Helen of Troy regulations, were considered an existential threat to the US corporate tax base.  In response, Congress enacted Section 7874 which provides that an inverted company (a technical definition, but Foreign Parent for these purposes) will pay tax on its built in US gain in the year of inversion and, if it remains substantially owned by US shareholders, will be treated as a US corporation notwithstanding that it is legally organized in a foreign country.

There are some minor exceptions to the corporate inversion rule involving acquisitions of US companies by larger foreign competitors and relocations of the actual physical corporate headquarters.  Ironically, other than in the context of corporate inversions, the tax law is completely indifferent to these factors.  A company legally formed in Delaware is a US corporation regardless of its primary place of business.  A merger can be a tax-free reorganization regardless if the larger or smaller business survives.  As a general rule, the tax law is supposed to be as neutral as possible to real business decisions; the corporate inversion rules are precisely the opposite, conditioning tax benefits on the changing the real business of the company.

For these reasons, Section 7874 could be considered a somewhat radical solution, and was considered as such at time (at least by the New York State Bar Association).  In particular, it represents the first time the US has departed significantly from its traditional “place of incorporation” rule for determining the US status of corporate taxpayers.  This could be thought of as, what I call, a “once a US corporation always a US corporation rule.”  This brings us full circle back to Dell.  Dell is a US company because Michael Dell formed a US corporation when it was a small mail-order computer company.  Now that it is a large, multinational public corporation there are significant tax savings to be achieved by unlocking the foreign profits from US tax.  The answer is an inversion.  The problem is that only a foreign buyer can achieve a corporate inversion without triggering the “once a US corporation always a US corporation” rule.  The solution – a foreign hybrid parent entity.  That is a topic for another post.

Blog by Nate Archives: Cultural Exceptions and the Proposed US-EU Trade Pact (June 17, 2013)

[I am migrating to my new blog along with my new house, and new job.  But my family and my old blog posts are coming with.  Here is one of the blog posts.]

Cultural Exceptions and the Proposed US-EU Trade Pact: Just guessing

There has been quite a bit of press about the US EU free trade negotiations.  The major news is that the French government has been posturing on “cultural” industries.

Matthew Yglesias has a much more sober take on the issue.

One interesting parallel is the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) that failed in 1998.  One potential reason for the collapse of the this OECD investment agreement were issues related to cultural industries.  This ranged from French movies to Canadian radio quotas.

While cultural heritiage probably had some hand in torpeodoing this agreement, the failure was overdetermined.  In the book, Fighting the Wrong Enemy, Edward Graham argues that there was very tepid support for the MAI from the business community, limited interest from politicians, and outright hostility from civil society.  Protestors claimed victory when it failed while others blamed the hundreds of pages of cultural exceptions for killing the agreement.  But these seem like self-serving explanations.

Back to the US-EU agreement.  Why is there so much postering over cultural issues?  Most of these issues aren’t really even covered in the proposed US-EU pact.  One guess is that the the French government can claim victory by excluding cultural industries that probably weren’t going to be included in the agreement in the first place.  Other countires, like the US, probably would like to see French concessions in other policy areas, so allowing them a polical victory is a good way to hammer out an agreement.

To be honest, I’m making a lot of guessing on what is going on in this specific agreement, but MAI might provide some guidance on the role of cultural industries in trade and investment agreements.

Blog by Nate Archives: Cash Transfers and the Resource Curse (June 14, 2014)

[I am migrating old content onto my new blog.  A lot has been written on cash transfers in the last twelve months.  I recommend checking out Chris Blattman’s blog.]

Cash Transfers and the Resource Curse: Random Musing while on Parental Leave

Chris Blattman’s post on the value of cash transfers in economic development got me thinking about the other ways in which cash transfers could be used to solve a number of governance issues.  The Center for Global Development has a series of proposals on using cash transfers to mitigate the natural resource curse.  Here is a quick summary:

Todd Moss, senior fellow and vice president for programs at the Center for Global Development, demonstrates how leaders of poor countries can beat the resource curse — the paradox that countries that strike it rich often suffer from high poverty, dismal governance, and terrible corruption. His policy option, called Oil to Cash, helps foster a social contract in resource-rich countries by directly distributing natural resource revenues. Under this proposal, a government would transfer some or all of the revenue from natural resource extraction to citizens in a universal, transparent, and regular payment–and, importantly, then tax part of it back.

CGD also has a paper that addresses some potential criticisms, although these aren’t some of the obvious ones I would think of.

This is a really interesting idea, but I have a few concerns.

1.     The link between natural resources, political violence, and authoritarian is often attributed to the value of the state when the state controls natural resources.  See Thad Dunning’s excellent book.  It isn’t clear to me how cash transfers would change the incentives to rebel or for leaders hold onto power.  Unless there is a credible commitment to provide cash transfers in perpetuity, that value of controlling the state is very, very high.  That is one of the problems with natural resource wealth.

2.     Michael Ross has pointed out that many countries can use their natural resources as a means to borrow in international capital markets.  These “booty futures” lower the cost of borrowing for the state.  As long as natural resource producers can borrow against resource wealth, this can provide a steady stream of rents to the government.

3.     One classic problem with natural resources is that prices are volatile, affecting a government’s ability to budget.  I can imagine this being even more problematic for citizens.  One reason for governments (or MNCs) to control resources is that they mitigating the adverse effects of price volatility.

4.     A strong assumption in this work is that by allocating resources and then taxing them, citizens will demand more from the government.  This argument isn’t new, but I think the empirical evidence on this is shaky.  There is some good work on the “fiscal illusion” where citizens are especially bad at linking the costs of government spending to their own tax bills.

One final speculative concern, related to my own research, is how giving citizens direct access to revenue streams would affect a government’s incentives to uphold contracts with firms.  Many natural resource expropriations are popular with at least some segments of society.  Would giving citizens a direct financial stake in natural resource contracts increase their incentives to support expropriations or contract renegotiations with natural resource extraction firms?  Do citizens care more or less than the government about the reputational costs of reneging on contracts?

These are just a few random musings while my newborn son sleeps.  He sleeps a lot.  Shoot me off an email if you have seen any research related to this topic.

Blog by Nate Archives: (June 7, 2013)

[This is old content migrating to my new blog.  These two organizations are fantastic and I hope to continue supporting them even though I have left St. Louis.]

Quick Post on St. Louis Charities

I originally started this blog while on parental leave with my now two-year old son (Walter).  We have a one-week old baby boy (Stanley) and home and I will be on leave again in the fall.

Not sleeping much at night and hanging out with a napping baby during the day doesn’t leave a lot of energy for serious research, but it does give some time to post thoughts or ideas I’ve had over the year.

Chris Blattman’s recent post on his giving to charity had me thinking.

A few years ago my wife and I decided to give more to charity.  I emailed a few development types to get recommendations.  Despite the natural proclivity of academics to be critical of any organization, I received some good suggestions.  Quite a few development scholars recommended Innovation for Poverty Action.

I can offer two local (St. Louis) charities.

The International Institute St. Louis provides services to the refugee community in St. Louis.  I’ve done some volunteering with the institute and found that they provide extremely valuable services to refugees without the paternalism or disempowerment you see at some NGOs.

My new favorite is the Migrant and Immigrant Community Action Project (MICA Project).  This is a NGO that was founded by recent WashU J.D.s that provides legal services to low income immigrants.  I know one of the founders (she went to school with my wife) and have a lot of respect for the organization.

Blog by Nate Archives: Controlling Corporate Tax Avoidance (June 6, 2013)

[More blog migration of old content.  I’m very interested in this issue.  Blog posts to come.]

Controlling Corporate Tax Avoidance

US Rules on Procurement and Tax Haven Subsidiaries

As part of a research project with Adam Rosensweig we examined a GAO report on U.S. companies using tax havens.  The report finds that 83 of the largest U.S. companies sampled had at least one subsidary in a country considered a tax haven.

Given how easy it is to use havens to avoid taxes, why don’t they all use tax havens?  Some companies, such as Walmart, have few foreign affiliates in general, and struggle to shift profits overseas given the structure of their business.

But there are a quick a few high tech companies that have patents that they could park offshore, yet they don’t seem to use tax havens.  Why?

Adam identified a statute (6 U.S.C.A. § 395) that specifically bars companies receiving government contracts from using tax havens (“inverted domestic corporations”).  There seems to be a least one straightforward way to control the use of tax havens.

Blog by Nate Archives: Are Bribes Tax Deductible (May 23, 2013)

[This migration of my old blog content includes a few active projects.  I’m working on a couple of bribery projects.  New posts to come.]

Are Bribes Tax Deductible?

Rarely do two seemingly unrelated research projects come together.  One of my areas of research is tax competition for foreign investment.  The second is firm level corruption in developing countries.

I’m working on a paper that examines how the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions affects the propensity of firms to pay bribes.

While this convention came into force in 1999 and now includes 40 signatories (34 OECD and 6 non-OECD countries), the OECD has provided further guidance on rules on tax deductibility of bribes.  That’s right.  Bribery is tax deductible in a number of countries, including some countries that have signed the convention.

In a few countries bribes have been illegal and not tax deductible for decades.   The 1977 US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes bribery illegal and thus bribes are not tax deductible.  Apple and Starbucks reduced their taxes through other means.

But this OECD Observer article provides some interesting comparisons across countries on how bribes are treated:

In 1996 only 14 denied the deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials as a general rule. Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States denied it because of the illicit nature of the bribe in their own countries. In fact, if any part of the offence was committed in the United Kingdom, for example, whether the offer, the agreement to pay, the soliciting, the acceptance, or the payment itself, it would be covered by the corruption laws and would then not qualify for tax relief. Under Poland’s law, bribery is illegal and an offence for both the briber and the recipient of the bribe and both are punishable.

Other countries adopted approaches that were perhaps a little less explicit. The Czech Republic, for example, classified all bribes as gifts, which were mostly not deductible. In Japan, bribes were categorised as entertainment expenses, which by definition made them non-deductible anyway. In several countries – Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Spain and Turkey – bribes of foreign officials simply did not qualify as a deductible expense, and were thus not allowed, even if there were no explicit provisions against them in some of these countries. In Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, bribes paid to foreign public officials were only deductible if they were documented business expenses and if they were a customary practice in the country of the recipient.

In the remaining countries – Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, New Zealand and Switzerland – bribes to foreign public officials were still as deductible as any other business expense, at least in principle. In practice, a deduction for a bribe was often disallowed because of insufficient documentation to support the fact that the expense was a necessary part of the transaction in question. Moreover, the deductibility of bribes to foreign officials was generally conditioned upon disclosing the identity of the recipient to the tax authorities, which taxpayers are naturally reluctant to do.

The article closes with some details on progress has been made across countries passing legislation that no longer allows the tax deductibility of bribes.

Blog by Nate Archives: Want to buy some film tax credits? (May 10, 2013)

[I am migrating my old blog content to my new blog.  I swear this post has something interesting for future research, but shortly after this post my 2nd son was born.  I’m mostly focusing on diaper changes.]

Want to buy some film tax credits?: Secondary Markets for Incentives

I’ve been working away on a book manuscript on investment incentives.  For the loyal reader(s) of this blog, I’m sure you’re tired of this topic.  But a friend of mine just emailed me some info about buying “unused” tax credits.

One interesting issue that we haven’t addressed in our research is the use of different types of incentive programs to attract firms.  Some countries, states and cities provide direct grants or loans to firms.  More common in the U.S. is providing tax exemptions or credits to firms.  The rhetoric behind these programs is that governments provide incentives to firms, but these firms only realize these incentives if they become profitable.

A lawyer friend of mine just emailed me that they have seen a bunch of tradable tax credits cross their desk.  Many U.S. incentive programs allow for the selling of tax credits.   My friend said that in Missouri they often trade for as much as $0.93 cents on the dollar.

To put this in broader perspective, here is an article about tradable film tax credits.

Unfortunately, numerous articles have noted that this isn’t a transparent market.  A few sites have tried to build tax credit exchanges but there seems to be very little trade volume on these sites.

I don’t have any punchy conclusion.  My gut is that these large incentives are almost as valuable to firms as cash (93 cents on the dollar) yet politicians aren’t criticized for handing out cash to firms.

If you have any data on this or general thoughts, drop me an email.

Blog by Nate Archive: Do No Harm Does Some Harm (May 4, 2013)

[The blog migration continues.  Old posts from May 2013.]

“Do No Harm” Does Some Harm: Pennsylvania Film Tax Credits

U.S. Film Tax Credits and other film and TV incentive program have been heavily criticized as wasteful government programs.

Pennsylvania provided a $5.1 million tax credit to Open 4 Business Productions to film a TV program in Philadelphia.  I thought I would take a quick look at the incentive.

The incentive was to film the medical drama series “Do No Harm” which proposed to generate 100 jobs.  The size of this incentive was identified as the main reason the show was filmed in Philadelphia.

This is what I can tell.  This series received one of the absolute worst ratings of any pilot and was canceled after two episodes.  Instead of seeing Pennsylvania taxpayer funded “Do No Harm” we will see even more episodes of Law and Order SVU in its place.

These film credits are notoriously complex, often with incentives ranging from construction in state, to hiring workers, to buying the rights of musicians who live in state.  I’m not sure how much the states lost or gained from this show.  But it seems clear that the show was terrible.